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Abstract We consider multi-item exchange markets in which agents want to receive
one of their target bundles of resources. The model encompasses well-studied mar-
kets for kidney exchange, lung exchange, and multi-organ exchange. We identify a
general and sufficient condition called weak consistency for the exchange mecha-
nisms to be strategyproof even if we impose any kind of distributional, diversity, or
exchange cycle constraints. Within the class of weakly consistent and strategyproof
mechanisms, we highlight two important ones that satisfy constrained Pareto opti-
mality and strong individual rationality. Several results in the literature follow from
our insights. We also derive impossibility results when constrained Pareto optimality
is defined with respect to more permissive individual rationality requirements.
Keywords Housing markets · Kidney exchange · Organ exchange · Strategyproof-
ness · Pareto optimality · Individual rationality
JEL Classification: C70 · D61 · D71
1 Introduction
Clearing complex exchange markets are one of the successful applications of algo-
rithmic economics and multi-agent systems (see e.g., (So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2011)).
Key domains for which algorithms have been designed include housing markets and
kidney exchange markets. In recent years, market designers are turning their atten-
tion to liver and lung exchange markets. There are proposals to explore the efficiency
gains via multi-organ exchange markets (see e.g., (Dickerson and Sandholm, 2017)).
Apart from exchanging organs or housing, several new digital platforms have come
up that facilitate bartering of goods. Exchange markets are also useful to model time-
bank scenarios in which people exchange services rather than items.
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2In most of the organ exchange markets, it is supposed that agents have single-
minded dichotomous preferences over outcomes: they are either satisfied with an
allocation or they are not. We consider a general model of item or organ exchange
that captures all such organ markets. Each agent is endowed with a set of items and
each agent has a set of target sets of items. An agent is satisfied if she gets any one of
those target sets of items.
The primary focus both in theory and practice is on the optimisation problem
of satisfying the maximum number of agents. The problem is computationally com-
plex even for single-unit allocations if there is a bound on the size of the exchange
cycles (Abraham et al., 2007). It is also computationally hard if there are agents
who have multi-unit demands as is the case of needing two liver or lung compo-
nents (Luo and Tang, 2015). In this paper, we do not pursue computational issues but
focus on the issue of strategyproofness of mechanisms.
In exchange settings, strategyproofness is an important property to ensure the sta-
bility and efficiency of a market. Manipulable mechanisms may give incentives for
agents to hide their resources which can affect the efficiency of the market. They can
also give incentives to agents to misreport their preferences in which case the mecha-
nisms may be optimising on the wrong input. In contrast to traditional voting settings,
in which strategyproofness and Pareto optimality be achieved by implementing some
variant of serial dictatorship, the same argument need not work for exchange set-
tings in which agents have the ability to ‘veto’ certain outcomes because individual
rationality is imposed.
Our primary contribution is formalizing a general property of mechanisms called
weak consistency and proving that any mechanism satisfying weak consistency is
strategyproof. Within the class of weakly consistent mechanisms, we highlight two
subclasses of mechanisms which have proved useful in restricted domains. The first
one is called constrained priority (CP) and the second one is called constrained
utilitarian priority (CUP). Both mechanisms run a serial dictatorship type priority
mechanism on the set of feasible and individually rational allocations. We show that
the mechanisms satisfy strategyproofness and constrained Pareto optimality. We then
show how a subtle difference in imposing a different version of individual rationality
results in impossibility results even for single-minded agents.
2 Related Work
The design of individually rational, Pareto efficient and strategyproof algorithms for
exchange problems is one of the most intensely studied topics in market design.
Under strict preferences, single-unit demands and single-unit allocations, the well-
known Gale’s Top Trading Cycles algorithm satisfies all the three ‘gold standard’
properties. If the preferences are allowed to be weak, there exist extensions of the
TTC algorithm that satisfy the three properties (see e.g., (Jaramillo and Manjunath,
2012; Plaxton, 2013; Saban and Sethuraman, 2013)).
There has also been work on strategyproof exchange with multiple endowments.
When preferences are not dichotomous and agents own more than one item, then
strategyproofness, Pareto efficiency, and individual rationality are generally impossi-
3ble to achieve (see e.g., (Papai, 2007; Konishi et al., 2001; Todo et al., 2014)). Some
positive results depend on the fact that agents have lexicographic preferences over
items or items types. Under these assumptions, it is possible to construct extensions
of TTC that achieve strategyproofness, individual rationality, and Pareto optimality
(see e.g., (Fujita et al., 2015; Sikdar et al., 2017)). The preferences we consider do
not assume any of these structural restrictions that are based on lexicographic or con-
ditional lexicographic comparisons. Biro´ et al. (2015) examined a discrete exchange
setting in which agents have strict preferences over objects but there can be multiple
copies of objects. They study the conditions under which strategyproofness can be
achieved.
There has also been work on multi-item exchanges when preferences are dichoto-
mous. Roth et al. (2005) show that for pairwise kidney exchanges, a priority mecha-
nism is strategyproof. In a highly insightful paper, Hatfield (2005) extended the argu-
ment to any kidney exchange framework with any kind of constraints on the feasible
allocation including bounds on the exchange cycles. More recently, Luo and Tang
(2015) considered lung exchange and again showed that a priority mechanism ap-
plied to the set of allocations satisfying the maximum number of agents is strate-
gyproof. Abbassi et al. (2015) considered general exchange problems in which agents
partition the items into liked and disliked. Agents’ utilities are not single-minded be-
cause they are interested in maximizing the number of liked items. For their model,
Abbassi et al. (2015) presented an algorithm that is strategyproof and Pareto optimal.
However, the algorithm relies on the fact that there are no constraints such as on the
size of exchange cycles.
When preferences are single-minded, computing an allocation that satisfies the
maximum number of agents is an NP-hard problem even if each agent has two
items (Luo and Tang, 2015). Even for kidney exchange in which each agent gets
at most one item, computing an allocation that satisfies the maximum number of
agents is an NP-hard problem if there is an upper bound on the size of the exchange
cycles (Abraham et al., 2007). In this paper, we do not focus on computational prob-
lems.
Dichotomous preferences are well-studied in other context as well such as
two-sided matching (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2004), auctions Mishra and Roy
(2013), non-cooperative games (Harrenstein et al., 2001), single-winner vot-
ing (Brams and Fishburn, 2007), committee voting (Aziz et al., 2017) and probabilis-
tic voting (Bogomolnaia et al., 2005).
3 Model and Concepts
An exchange market is a tuple (N,O, e,D) where N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n agents
and O be the set of items. The vector e = (e1, . . . , en) specifies the endowment ei ⊂ O
of each agent i ∈ N. We suppose that
⋃
ei = O and ei ∩ e j = ∅. Each agent has a
demand set Di ⊂ 2
2O . Each element of Di is a bundle of items that is acceptable to
agent i and meets her goal of being in the exchange market.
Just like the endowment, any allocation x = (x1, . . . , xn) specifies the allocated
bundle xi ⊂ O of each agent i ∈ N. In any allocation x, xi ∩ x j = ∅. Where the context
4is clear, we refer to the allocation bundle xi as the allocation of agent i. We say that
allocation x satisfies agent i is xi ⊇ d for some d ∈ Di.
For any two allocations xi, yi ⊆ O, one can define the preference relation %i of
agent i where xi %i yi if and only if yi satisfies i implies that xi satisfies i. The weak
preference relation gives rise to the indifference relation ∼i which holds if xi %i yi and
yi %i xi. It also gives rise to the strict part ≻i of the relation where xi ≻i yi if xi %i yi
and xi 6%i yi.
Example 1 Consider an exchange market in which there are 3 agents. Agent 1 has 4
cars {c1, c2, c3, c4}. Agent 2 has a valuable painting p. Agent 3 has a sports bike s and
a helmet h. Agent 1 will only be satisfied if she gets a painting and keeps one of the
cars. Agent 2 will only be satisfied if she gets car c1 or sports bike s and helmet h.
Agent 3 will be satisfied if she gets car c4. The information can be captured in the
form of an exchange market (N,O, e,D) where
– N = {1, 2, 3}
– O = {c1, c2, c3, c4, h, p, s}
– e1 = {c1, c2, c3, c4}; e2 = {p}; e3 = {s, h}
– D1 = {{c, p} : c ∈ e1}; D2 = {{c1}, {s, h}}; D3 = {c4}.
A possible allocation that satisfies all the agents is x where x1 = {p, c1, c2, c3}; x2 =
{s, h}; x3 = {c4}.
An allocation x is strongly individually rational (S-IR) if xi = ei or xi ⊇ d for
some d ∈ Di. Informally, if an agent’s goal is not met, she is not interested in using
up any of her endowed resources. This is a standard assumption is settings such as
kidney exchange. Except for the last section, we will restrict our attention to S-IR al-
locations. Enforcing the S-IR requirement can also be seen as enforcing the standard
individual rationality requirement for agents that have a special type of trichoto-
mous preferences. In such special trichotomous preferences, agents ideally want to
get an acceptable allocation, then they next prefer getting their endowment, and they
least prefer a bundle which does not satisfy them and which is not their endowment.
Enforcing the S-IR requirement can also be viewed as a special type of feasibility
constraint.
Our model can also model altruistic donors who are happy with any allocation.
We are interested in maximizing the number of agents who are satisfied. We say that
an allocation x is constrained Pareto optimal within the set of allocations satisfying
set τ of properties if there exists no allocation y satisfying τ such that yi %i xi for all
i ∈ N and yi ≻i xi for some i ∈ N.
The Generality of the Model Our model captures any kind of exchange market in
which agents are interested in getting one of the acceptable bundles. If |ei| = 1 for
each i ∈ N and |d| = 1 for each d ∈ Di, the market can model a kidney exchange mar-
ket (Abraham et al., 2007). If |ei| = 2 for each i ∈ N and |d| = 2 for each d ∈ Di, the
market can model a lung exchange market (Luo and Tang, 2015). It can also model
multi-organ exchange market (Dickerson and Sandholm, 2017). The model also al-
lows for altruistic donors who have real items to give but in return, they are happy to
5get null items. We allow O to contain dummy or null items so as allow imbalanced
exchanges in which an agent may get different numbers of items that she gives away.
In that case, any allocation for I = (N,O, e,D) has a one-to-one correspondence with
a set of cycles in which each item points to her agent and each agent points to an item
she gets in the allocation. The cycles are referred to as exchange cycles.
Mechanisms A mechanism M is a function that maps each problem instance I =
(N,O, e,D) into an allocation. We say that a mechanism is S-IR if it returns an S-IR
allocation for each instance.
Let ρ(I) denote the set of allocations that are feasible with respect to some feasi-
bility constraints denoted by ρ. Depending on what the feasibility constraints ρ cap-
ture, the term ρ(I) could denote the set of allocations based on pairwise exchanges or
exchanges cycles of size at most 3, or satisfying some distribution or diversity con-
straint. In principle, ρ could also capture the S-IR requirement. Whatever feasibility
conditions we assume on the model, we will assume that they allow the endowment
allocation to be a feasible allocation. That is the only minimal assumption we make
on the feasibility constraints. It ensures that there always exists at least one allocation
satisfying the feasibility constraints.
Since we are interested in mechanisms that satisfy any given feasibility con-
straints represented by ρ, we can view a mechanism as a function that maps
ρ-feasible allocations to some allocation while taking into account the information
in I. Without loss of generality, we can think of mechanisms as choice functions
that choose one of the ‘best’ allocations from the set of feasible allocations. For any
mechanism M and restriction ρ, one can define the mechanism K(I) = M(I, ρ(I))
that only returns some allocation from the set of allocations ρ(I). More generally, we
will refer to M(I, Y) as applying M to the problem instance but only allowing K to
return an allocation from the set of allocations Y.
Whereas each agent’s private information is (ei,Di), she can report any e
′
i
and
D′
i
. We will assume i can only declare an endowment that she actually has, therefore
any reported endowment ei, we assume that e
′
i
⊆ ei. We say that a mechanism is
strategyproof if there exists no instance under which some agent has an incentive to
misreport her private information to get a more preferred outcome for herself. For
strategyproof mechanisms, truth-telling is a dominant strategy for each agent.
4 Weak consistency implies strategyproofness
We first present a general definition of weak consistency that applies to any social
choice setting. Recall that in our setting, for any agent i with demand set Di, and for
any two allocation xi and yi, it is the case that xi ∼i yi if both xi and yi satisfy i with
respect to Di or neither satisfy her.
Consider ρ(I) a set of feasible allocations defined with respect to some feasibility
constraints ρ. A mechanism K is weakly consistent if
6for any Y, Y′ such that Y′ ⊆ Y ⊆ ρ(I), and for any x = K(I, Y) and y ∈ Y′ ⊂ Y
such that xi ∼i yi for all i ∈ N implies that z = K(I, Y
′) where zi ∼i xi for all
i ∈ N.
Informally,weak consistency requires that if the set of feasible outcomes is contracted
but it is still possible for each agent to get the same satisfaction level, then each agent
does get the same satisfaction level from the returned outcome.
Note that weak consistency is weaker than the consistency condition considered
by Hatfield (2005). Weak consistency condition is a weaker form of Sen’s α condi-
tion (Sen, 1971) or Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999).
Theorem 1 Any weakly consistent and S-IR mechanism is strategyproof.
Proof. Consider a weakly consistent mechanism K. Suppose that an agent i reports
(ei,Di) and gets an allocation xi. If xi ⊇ d for some d ∈ Di, then agent i has no
incentive to misreport. Therefore, we suppose for contradiction that xi + d for each
d ∈ Di.
Suppose that i reports (e′
i
,D′
i
) such that the resultant allocation is x′ and i gets an
acceptable bundle b according to Di. Since we assumed in our setup that i can only
declare an endowment that she actually has, therefore e′
i
⊆ ei. We denote the set of
resources given by i to the market by s. Since K is weakly consistent, if i only reports
bundle b as acceptable and only reports ei, then the mechanism should still choose
the same allocation for agent i. Formally, if i reports e′
i
= s and D′
i
= {b}, then the
allocation for i is b.
Since K is weakly consistent and S-IR, we can view K as a choice mechanism
choosing from the set of feasible and S-IR allocations. It chose an allocation x′ when
i reported (e′
i
,D′
i
). Now consider i expanding her reported endowment e′
i
to ei ⊇ e
′
i
and her reported demand set D′
i
to Di ⊇ D
′
i
. When i reports (ei,Di), some additional
feasible and S-IR allocations may emerge as well. When i reports (ei,Di), the only
new feasible S-IR allocations are those in which i gets one of her acceptable bundles
according to Di. By weak consistency, one of the three cases hold:
(i) the same allocation x is returned in which case i is satisfied with respect to Di
(ii) some other allocation y , x is returned such that all agents are indifferent with
x. In this case, i is satisfied with respect to Di.
(iii) some allocation z is returned such that some agent is not indifferent between x
and z. In this case the allocation must be one of the new allocation resulted from
i expanding her reported endowment e′
i
to ei ⊇ e
′
i
and her reported demand set
D′
i
to Di ⊇ D
′
i
. Such a new allocation cannot be one in which i does not trade
any item because in that case, it would even be feasible, when i did not expand
her reported sets e′
i
and Di. Therefore, it must be the case that i did trade some
items. Since we assume the S-IR requirement, if i did trade, then i gets some
allocation that satisfies her with respect to one her demands in Di.
Since i is satisfied with respect to Di in all the cases, it contradicts the assumption
that i benefited from misreporting (e′
i
,D′
i
). ⊓⊔
Our proof technique is along the same lines as Theorem 2 of Hatfield (2005).
In contrast to the result by Hatfield (2005), (1) our result applies to any exchange
7market where agents can have any number of items (2) it considers a property which
is weaker than the consistency property used by him and (3) it explicitly uses the
S-IR requirement which was implicitly used in the proof by Hatfield. As a corollary,
we recover the central result from the paper by Hatfield. Since we focus on the S-IR
requirement explicitly, it leads to a better understanding when the more permissive
requirement of IR is used.
Corollary 1 (Theorem 2 of Hatfield (2005)) For exchange markets with dichoto-
mous preferences and single-unit demands and endowments, any consistent mecha-
nism K is strategyproof.
5 Constrained Priority Mechanisms
In this section, we focus on two natural weakly consistent mechanisms. The mech-
anisms are adaptations of the idea of applying serial dictatorship and priority over
the set of all feasible outcomes (see e.g. (Aziz et al., 2013)). The mechanisms are
parametrized with respect to ρ (a set of feasibility constraints) and pi which is a prior-
ity ordering over the agent set in which the agent in j-th turn is denoted by pi( j). Both
rules are based on lexicographic comparisons.
For any permutation pi of N, the CP mechanism is defined as follows.
CP(I, ρ, pi) = arg lexmax
x∈ρ(I)
(upi(1)(x), . . . , upi(n)(x)).
For any permutation pi of N, the CUP mechanism is defined as follows.
CUP(I, ρ, pi) = arg lexmax
x∈ρ(I)
(
∑
i∈N
ui(x), upi(1)(x), . . . , upi(n)(x)).
CP starts from the set of feasible allocations and then refines this set by using
a priority ordering over the agents. CUP starts from the set of feasible allocations
satisfying the maximum number of agents and then refines this set by using a priority
ordering over the agents. Both CP and CUP are flexible enough to enforce or not
enforce S-IR as part of the feasibility constraints.
The following remark points out that CUP is a general mechanism that has been
used in restricted domains when S-IR is enforced.
Remark 1 When applied to pairwise kidney allocation, CP and CUP are equivalent to
the priority mechanism considered by Roth et al. (2005). When applied to kidney ex-
change, CUP is equivalent to the priority mechanism considered by Hatfield (2005).
When applied to kidney exchange, CUP is equivalent to the lexicographic mecha-
nism considered by Luo and Tang (2015). When applied to housing allocation with
existing tenants, CUP is equivalent to the MIR algorithm of Aziz (2019).
Next, it is shown that CUP and CP are weakly consistent.
Lemma 1 CUP and CP are weakly consistent.
8Proof. For any set of feasible allocations, CP and CUP can be seen as choice func-
tions that choose the ‘best’ allocation from the set. When that allocation is removed
the set, the next choices of CP and CUP can be selected. Hence both CP and CUP can
be seen as inducing a weak order on the set of feasible allocations. In such a weak
order, any two feasible allocations in which each agent gets the same utility, are in
the same indifference class. If an allocation is removed from the set of feasible allo-
cations, then note that the relative ordering of the other allocations does not change.
Hence CP and CUP both satisfy weak consistency. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2 For any feasibility restriction ρ on the set of S-IR allocations, CUP is
strategyproof.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
Theorem 3 For any feasibility restriction ρ on the set of S-IR allocations, CP is
strategyproof.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
As corollaries of the above theorem, we obtain several results where the mecha-
nisms referred to in the corollaries are essentially applying CP to a restricted domain
of exchange problems where S-IR is enforced.
Corollary 2 (Theorem 1, Roth et al. (2005)) For pairwise kidney exchange mar-
kets, the priority mechanism is strategyproof.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 2 and Remark 1. ⊓⊔
Corollary 3 (Corollary 3, Hatfield (2005)) For kidney exchange markets, the pri-
ority mechanism is strategyproof even if we impose any constraint on the exchange
cycle sizes.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 2 and Remark 1. ⊓⊔
Corollary 4 (Theorem 2, Luo and Tang (2015)) For lung exchange markets where
no cycle constraints are imposed, the lexicographic mechanism (Luo and Tang, 2015)
is strategyproof.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 2 and Remark 1. ⊓⊔
Corollary 5 (Proposition 5, Aziz (2019)) For house allocation with existing tenants,
the MIR algorithm (Aziz, 2019) is strategyproof.
Proof. The statement follows from Theorem 2 and Remark 1. ⊓⊔
If we include S-IR in the set of feasibility requirements ρ, then note that both
CP and CUP return an allocation that is Pareto optimal allocation within the set of
allocations satisfying S-IR and ρ. Hence, we can rephrase our result in the form of
the following theorem.
9Theorem 4 Under dichotomous preferences, for any restriction on allocations ρ,
there exists a strategyproof mechanism that returns an allocation that satisfies con-
strained Pareto optimality among the set of all allocations that satisfy ρ and S-IR.
Since imposing S-IR is similar to imposing IR when agents have trichotomous
preferences, we can rephrase the theorem above as follows.
Theorem 5 Under trichotomous preferences where each agent only has her own en-
dowment as the second preferred outcome, for any restriction on allocations ρ, there
exists a strategyproof mechanism that returns an allocation that satisfies constrained
Pareto optimality among the set of all allocations that satisfy ρ and IR.
6 Impossibility Results
In the previous sections, we limited our attention to allocations that satisfy S-IR
(strong individual rationality).We now explore the consequence of dropping the S-IR
requirement. An allocation x is individually rational (IR) if ei ⊇ d for some d ∈ Di
implies that xi ⊇ d
′ for some d′ ∈ Di.
Whereas IR is a less stringent requirement than S-IR, constrained Pareto optimal-
ity with respect to allocations satisfying IR is a stronger property than constrained
Pareto optimality with respect to allocations satisfying S-IR. In fact, the property is
stronger enough that our central results in the previous sections collapse. In particu-
lar Theorem 5 changes into an impossibility result as we expand the set of feasible
allocations.
The proof is based on an adaptation of an impossibility result for strategyproof
mechanisms maximizing total utility of agents in which agents want to get as many
desirable items as possible and their utilities are not single-minded (Theorem 1,
(Abbassi et al., 2015)). We adapt the argument to only consider agents having single-
minded utilities: they are only satisfied if they get one of their targets sets of items.
The subtle difference from the previous section is that we do not enforce S-IR which
expands the set of feasible of allocations and leads to an impossibility result.
We say that an allocation is a result of pairwise exchanges if it is a result of pairs of
agents make one-for-one exchange for items and with each item changing ownership
at most once. Considering the exchange cycles view of allocations as mentioned in
Section 3, an allocation as a result of pairwise exchange is characterized by exchange
cycles in which each cycle has at most two agents in it.
Theorem 6 Consider ρ as the restriction of allowing allocations that are a result of
pairwise item exchanges in which agents get desirable items. For |N| ≥ 3, there ex-
ists no strategyproof mechanism that returns an allocation that is constrained Pareto
optimal among the set of all allocations that satisfy ρ.
Proof. Consider a set of three agents N = {1, 2, 3}.
– e1 = {a1, a2, a3}.
– e2 = {b1, b2, b3}.
– e3 = {c1, c2, c3}.
10
Each agent i likes some items Ai ⊆ O:
– A1 = {b1, b3, c1, c2, c3}.
– A2 = {a1, a3, c1, c2, c3}.
– A3 = {a2, a3, b2, b3}.
– D1 = {S ⊂ O : |S | = 3 and S ⊂ A1}.
– D2 = {S ⊂ O : |S | = 3 and S ⊂ A2}.
– D3 = {S ⊂ O : |S | = 3 and S ⊂ A3}.
In any allocation that satisfies ρ and is Pareto optimal, two agents can be satisfied.
Since only allocations as a result of pairwise exchanges are allowed, the maximum
sized matching for 9 item nodes is at most 8. However at least one agent can get most
two acceptable items so it is not satisfied.
Suppose agent 1 is not satisfied. Then agent 1 can report A′
1
= {b3, c1, c2, c3} and
D′
1
= {S ⊂ O : |S | = 3 and S ⊂ A′
1
}. In that case, agent 1 is not willing to get item b1 in
any exchange and can force this because of the requirement we have in ρ. Agent 2 has
one item which is useless to other agents so in any ρ-feasible allocation it cannot be
satisfied because it does not get three items from A2. Therefore the only constrained
Pareto optimal allocations are those in which agent 1 exchanges a1 with b3, and a2
and a3 with two the items among e3. Therefore by changing her preference relation,
agent 1 gets satisfied.
Suppose agent 2 is not satisfied. Then agent 1 can report A′
2
= {a3, c1, c2, c3} and
D′
2
= {S ⊂ O : |S | = 3 and S ⊂ A′
2
}. In that case, agent 2 is not willing to get item a1
in any exchange and can force this because of the requirement we have in ρ. Agent
1 has one item which is useless to other agents so it in any ρ-feasible allocation it
cannot be satisfied because it does not get three items from A1. Therefore the only
constrained Pareto optimal allocations are those in which agent 2 exchanges b1 with
a3, and b2 and b3 with two the items among e3. Therefore by changing her preference
relation, agent 2 gets satisfied.
Suppose agent 3 is not satisfied. Then agent 3 can report A′
3
= {a3, b2, b3} and
D′
1
= {S ⊂ O : |S | = 3 and S ⊂ A′
3
}. In that case, agent 3 is not willing to get item a2
in any exchange and can force this because of the requirement we have in ρ. Agent
1 has one item which is useless to other agents so it in any ρ-feasible allocation it
cannot be satisfied because it does not get three items from A2. Therefore the only
constrained Pareto optimal allocations are those in which agent 3 exchanges all her
items with the items in the set A′
3
. Therefore by changing her preference relation,
agent 3 gets satisfied. ⊓⊔
The impossibility result is tight in the sense that for |N| ≤ 2, the properties can
be easily satisfied by the CP mechanism with the constraint of individual rationality.
Next we note that Theorem 6 can be rephrased as follows.
Theorem 7 Consider ρ as the restriction of allowing allocations that are a result of
pairwise item exchanges in which agents gets desirable items. For |N| ≥ 3, there ex-
ists no strategyproof mechanism that returns an allocation that is constrained Pareto
optimal among the set of all allocations that satisfy ρ and IR.
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Proof. Consider the proof of the previous theorem. Since none of the agents is sat-
isfied by their endowment, the IR requirement has no bite. In particular, the set of
allocations satisfying IR coincides with the set of all allocations. Hence, constrained
Pareto optimality among the set of all allocations that satisfy ρ is equivalent to con-
strained Pareto optimal among the set of all allocations that satisfy ρ and IR. ⊓⊔
7 Conclusions
We have provided a clearer understanding of strategyproof multi-item exchange mar-
kets in which agents have dichotomous preferences. We focussed on scenarios where
agents have single-minded preferences: they are either satisfied if they get a target
bundle or they are dissatisfied if they do not get a target bundle. Under these prefer-
ences, we showed that strategyproofness can be achieved even under arbitrary restric-
tions on feasible allocations. In fact, there exist mechanisms that satisfy constrained
Pareto optimality. We complement these results with a couple of impossibility results
when we strengthen constrained Pareto optimality by enforcing a weaker notion of
individual rationality. We envisage further algorithmic and game-theoretic research
on the general multi-item exchange model discussed in the paper.
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